Israel's Suicidal Strategic Mistake

Finally somebody  (Martin Sherman: The price of moderation)  has expressed accurately and succinctly the core problem at the root of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a problem that I (and only a few others) have argued for years. It is simply this: A viable Palestinian state means an indefensible Israel and a defensible Israel means a non-viable Palestinian state.  The rest is conversation.

Consequently, Israel committed a suicidal strategic mistake when it went for the Oslo accords.

The point that many well-intentioned pro-Israeli advocates seem be to missing is that it is precisely "moderate supporters of the two-state solution" that have in large measure sown the seeds for the de-legitimization of Israel. While initially this contention may appear somewhat counter-intuitive, the logic behind it is unassailable. For, once the legitimacy of a Palestinian state is conceded, the de-legitimization of Israel cannot be avoided. The chain of reasoning for this is clear: If the legitimacy of a Palestinian state is accepted, then necessarily any measures incompatible with its viability are illegitimate. However, Israel's minimum security requirements necessarily obviate the viability of Palestinian state. 

But it is not clear how Israel can correct that mistake now, even if the Jews do realize it, which is not likely to happen any time soon; on the contrary, they seem to intensify their insistence on it.  It's the nature of strategic mistakes that they are extremely difficult to correct.

So while Sherman argues that:

Accordingly for Israel to regain legitimacy, the notion of a Palestinian state must be discredited and removed from the discourse over the resolution of the Israel-Arab conflict. 

he recognizes this is critical but not feasible:

This of course easier said than done. For rolling back the accumulated decades of distortion, deception and delusion that have become entrenched in the collective international consciousness will be a Herculean task. But the immense scale of the task cannot diminish the imperative of its implementation.

Sherman argues what I have been arguing for a long time:

The side that will prevail is the side whose political acumen is the sharper and whose political will is the stronger. Indeed, never has the biblical wisdom of Solomon been more apt: Whoever agrees to divide that which is dear to him, will – at the end of the day- lose all of it. The Jews must realize that they can either be master of all the land west of the Jordan or none of it – and sooner that the better.

In fact I put it in much stronger terms: based on the two sides' policies to date I'm afraid one would have to conclude that the Palestinians will win because their political acumen is sharper and their political will is stronger.

Underlying this argument is a powerful scientific foundation. Here's how the Nobel laureat Professor Robert Aumann (Game Theory and negotiations with Arab countries) has put it:

This case in Game Theory is called the “Blackmailer Paradox." The paradox emerging from this case is that the rational Reuben is eventually forced to act clearly irrationally, in order to gain the maximum available to him. The logic behind this bizarre result is that Shimon broadcast total faith and confidence in his excessive demands, and he is able to convince Reuben to yield to his blackmail in order for him to receive the minimum benefit.

The Palestinians consistently and effectively played Shimon's blackmailer role while Reuven's Israel ignored the rules of the game.

Like all science, Game Theory does not presume to express an opinion on moral values, but rather seeks to analyze the strategic behaviors of rival parties in a common game. The State of Israel plays such a game with its enemies. Like every game, in the Arab-Israeli game there are particular interests that shape and frame the game and its rules. Unfortunately, Israel ignores the basic principles that arise in Game Theory.

In fact, Israel has played a different game altogether (Caroline Glick: Playing Israel's good hand).

The Palestinians understand the rules of diplomacy far better than Israel does. Israel believes that diplomacy is about getting other governments to be nice to us. Palestinians understand that diplomacy is a nonviolent means of weakening your enemies and expanding your own power. They also understand that the starting point for any effective diplomatic strategy is a reality-based assessment of other government's interests.

Game theory is defined as the rules of strategic behavior. Israel is in existential peril for ignoring them.

UPDATE: I barely posted this when I came across Elder of Zion's post (No Appeasement: 11 Reasons Why Israeli Concessions Will Not Bring Peace). He states:

The Europeans are frustrated, because they think they know what the major obstacle to peace is. Of course, it is Israeli intransigence. It is the existence of Jews wanting to live in the so-called West Bank, it is the hardheadedness of the Israeli government (especially the Likud,) it is “occupation,” it is Israeli refusal to negotiate on water, and Jerusalem, and descendants of refugees. it is a whole host of seeming issues. Once Israel sees the light and gives a few more concessions, the thinking goes, then the Arab world will welcome Israel with open arms as a full member of the Middle East. Terrorism will stop, Westerners will no longer need to go through security checks on airplanes, birds will sing Bach concertos in harmony and the lion will lie down with the lamb. 

Even though it's the Palestinians who play the blackmailer's role, it's Israel that is perceived to be intransigent. Such are the fruit of poor strategy.