As a result, the United States could face some unpleasant consequences. Western and American counterterrorism efforts could be undermined. The regimes that are being swept away devoted considerable resources to battling terrorist extremists and collaborated closely with the United States in that effort. Unfortunately, these same security services often were also oppressive. They undoubtedly will be purged, and — given popular hostility to the Bush administration's War on Terror — serious anti-terrorism programs could be reconstituted. Al-Qaida could have far more room to organize, recruit, train and even develop new terrorist weapons to attack the West.
A standoffish regime in Egypt could create many problems for the United States. Denial of automatic overflight rights and priority transit through the Suez Canal could seriously compromise U.S. military flexibility and capability further east. U.S. efforts to turn back the genocide in Sudan's Darfur region have depended heavily on Egyptian cooperation, which always seemed reluctant, but now may prove unavailable.
The issues underlying these questions make the current US Middle East policy clear: a declining US realigns with the Islamists by selling out Israel. This will be facilitated by a second Obama administration devoid of reelection considerations.
Indeed, if Obama's intentions from the start was to pressure Israel into capitulation, what better way to achieve that than bringing to power the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in Palestine.
If the Obama administration deludes itself that the Islamists will become US's friends just because it dumped Israel, they have another thing coming.